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Abstract and Keywords
A crucial question for a process view of life is how to identify a process and how 
to follow it through time. The genidentity view (first proposed by Kurt Lewin and 
later elaborated by Hans Reichenbach) can contribute decisively to this project. 
It says that the identity through time of an entity X is given by a well-identified 
series of continuous states of affairs. Genidentity helps address the problem of 
diachronic identity in the living world. This chapter describes the centrality of 
the concept of genidentity for David Hull and proposes an extension of Hull’s 
view to the ubiquitous phenomenon of symbiosis. Finally, using immunology as a 
key example, it shows that the genidentity view suggests that the main interest 
of a process approach is epistemological rather than ontological and that its 
principal claim is one of priority, namely that processes precede and define 
things, and not vice versa.
Keywords:   continuity, genidentity, Hull, David, identity, immune system, individuality, process, 
symbiosis
1. Introduction
What exactly is a process view of life? Philosophers of biology and biologists who 
have recently defended such a view (Dupré 2012; Bapteste and Dupré 2013; 
Dupré 2014) generally oppose processes (characterized by constant change) and 
things (characterized by stability and durability). But two major questions should 
be raised regarding this view:
(i) What kinds of relationships between ‘things’ and ‘processes’ are 
possible? Is it possible to countenance both ‘things’ and ‘processes’ as 
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categories that describe the living world, or are these two categories 
incompatible?
(ii) Can a priority claim about ‘things’ and ‘processes’ be made and, if so, 
on what grounds? Here the question is to determine what comes first— 
things or processes. Two main types of priority claims can be made: an 
ontological claim (the biological world is actually made of processes, and 
things are only partial and temporary stabilizations of processes); or one 
made from an epistemological perspective (for us as human beings, the 
best way to understand the biological world is to get access to it in terms 
of processes).1
In this chapter I would like to show that a preexisting view of the biological 
world, called the ‘genidentity view’, helps—especially in the variant defended by 
David Hull—to clarify what a process view of life might be. More specifically, the 
genidentity view is useful because it suggests that (a) the notions of processes 
and things are both needed in biology, but processes are prior to things; and (b) 
the main interest of adopting a process view is epistemological, not ontological. 
One key underlying objective of the present chapter will be to address a 
question that seems decisive for anyone who proposes to conceive of the 
biological world in terms of processes: what difference does it make, in actual 
practice, to adopt a process view?
 (p.97) Let me start with a preliminary definition of the notion of ‘genidentity’. 
In a nutshell, the genidentity view, which has been explored in the contexts of 
psychology, physics, and biology (Lewin 1922; Reichenbach 1956; Hull 1992; 
Boniolo and Carrara 2004; Pradeu and Carosella 2006b; Guay and Pradeu 
2016b), says that the identity through time of an entity X is given by a well- 
identified series of continuous states of affairs. Of course, this claim is not 
sufficient in itself; every precise application of the genidentity view requires a 
clarification of exactly which continuous states are being followed, and why. In 
the next pages I examine in detail the concept of genidentity, and then I show 
why it could constitute a decisive building block for the project of developing a 
process view for biology. After a short reminder of the origins of the concept of 
genidentity, I describe its centrality in David Hull’s reflections on biological 
identity. Following this, I suggest an extension of Hull’s view on the basis of 
recent data that demonstrate the ubiquity of symbiotic interactions in the living 
world. Finally, I explain why genidentity prompts us to adopt a multilevel and 
mainly epistemological view on biological processes.
2. What Is Genidentity? And How Can It Be Applied to the Living World?
What constitutes the identity through time of an entity X? For instance, in what 
sense can I be said to be the ‘same’ as the child I was, a cat the ‘same’ as the 
kitten it was, or a wave the ‘same’ wave while it is moving through the sea? 
These questions are particular instances of the more general problem of 
diachronic identity (or identity through time), undoubtedly one of the most 
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fundamental and most debated problems of all philosophy. The problem has been 
raised by major philosophers of the past, including Aristotle, Locke, and Leibniz. 
More recently, metaphysicians (both ‘perdurantists’ and ‘endurantists’) have 
offered important analyses of the same problem, for example David Wiggins 
(2001), Peter van Inwagen (1990), Theodore Sider (2001), and Katherine Hawley 
(2004).
One very interesting, though often neglected, way to address the problem of 
diachronic identity is to resort to the concept of genidentity. According to the 
genidentity view, the identity through time of an entity X is given by a well- 
identified series of continuous states of affairs. As will become clear in what 
follows, this view insists on the continuity of states rather than on the prior 
existence of objects; it conflicts radically with several forms of substantialism; 
and it is based on an epistemological (rather than ontological) attitude regarding 
science.
The concept of genidentity was proposed in 1922 by Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), a 
leading German American psychologist, as a way to better understand identity 
through time (Lewin 1922). It was neglected by most philosophers of science, 
but Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953) took it very seriously and explored it further. 
Indeed, Reichenbach examined different conceptions of genidentity and applied 
them to several physical cases (Reichenbach 1956).2 Today, however, the notion 
of  (p.98) genidentity is rarely used in philosophy in general and almost never in 
the philosophy of science, where the exceptions are few and far between (e.g. 
Hull 1992; Boniolo and Carrara 2004; Pradeu and Carosella 2006b; Guay and 
Pradeu 2016b; see also chapters 2, 4, 7, and 11 here).
In its insistence on defining identity as mere continuity, the concept of 
genidentity echoes in part Locke’s conception of identity. Indeed, in the second 
edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke (1975 [1694]) 
says that the long-sought ‘principle of individuation’ is to be found in a simple 
continuity of states. In the case of living things (plants or animals), the identity 
of a being is, according to Locke, the continuity of one and the same ‘life’. This 
illustrates what has been said above, namely that genidentity views always need 
to make clear exactly what states are followed and why (here, the continuity of a 
‘life’). Applied to humans, Locke’s view is as follows: ‘This also shows wherein 
the Identity of the same Man consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the 
same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession 
vitally united to the same organized Body’ (Locke 1975 [1694]: §6, 331). 
Interestingly, in his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, a text that 
constitutes a systematic response to Locke, Leibniz (1916 [1765]) strongly 
rejects Locke’s conception of identity because, for Leibniz, continuity by itself is 
insufficient to define identity: ‘By itself continuity no more constitutes substance 
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than does multitude or number…Something is necessary to be numbered, 
repeated and continued’ (Leibniz 1916 [1765]: 169).
Let us call substantialism the view according to which the identity of a thing X 
must be understood as the identity of a substance identified beforehand, and 
continuism the view according to which the identity of a thing X is given by a 
mere continuity of states (as defended by Locke). Substantialism is defended by 
Leibniz, but also by many contemporary philosophers, under different forms. 
One version of substantialism is essentialism, which states that what makes the 
identity of X through time is the fact that a core constituent or characteristic of 
X remains constant through time. In the case of living things, genetic 
essentialism says that a living thing remains the same through time in virtue of 
the fact that it possesses the same genome throughout (Kripke 1980). Another, 
significantly different version of substantialism is the ‘neo-Aristotelian’ view 
defended by Wiggins (2001). According to this view, the identity of a thing X is 
given by a sortal concept (a category), which defines a specific principle of 
activity (for example, it is possible to understand the identity of a given thing 
only by determining that it is, say, a dog and that what defines the identity of a 
dog is a certain principle of activity, common to all dogs).
I suggest here that the genidentity view constitutes a particularly interesting 
and fruitful version of continuism (and therefore a view that stands in contrast 
with substantialism in general), and that it can shed light on the question of the 
diachronic identity of living things. More precisely, I shall defend the thesis that 
genidentity is the best way to understand the diachronic identity of a living thing 
and that it helps to make the concept of biological process more precise. I first 
explain the centrality of the notion of genidentity in Hull’s thinking about the 
problem of individuality and then I show how his view can be extended to reflect 
important findings in recent biology, in particular regarding the phenomenon of 
symbiosis.
 (p.99) 3. The Inconspicuous Centrality of Genidentity in Hull’s Conception 
of Biological Individuality
David Hull (1935–2010) was undoubtedly one of the most influential 
philosophers of biology. Hull mentioned the notion of genidentity several times 
in his writings (Hull 1986, 1992), but these mentions remained largely unnoticed 
and, intriguingly, most other philosophers of biology did not follow Hull and did 
not adopt this notion.
How does Hull specifically apply the idea of genidentity? In other words, which 
states does Hull think one should follow over time in order to understand the 
identity of a living thing? His answer is that one should follow the continuity of 
an internal organization. Let me try to explain this idea in more detail.
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Even before Hull used the notion of genidentity explicitly, the idea behind it was 
already present in his writings. In particular, that idea underlies the view of 
identity presented in one of his most famous and influential texts: ‘A Matter of 
Individuality’ (Hull 1978). This paper is often seen as a defense of two theses: 
that species are individuals rather than classes, and that there is no ‘human 
nature’, no ‘essence’ of humanity (indeed, if humans are considered from the 
species point of view, that is, as tokens of Homo sapiens, it is impossible to 
define what are the necessary and sufficient characteristics that would make a 
given entity a human). Nevertheless, what in fact constitutes the basis of these 
two theses is the conception of identity Hull defends; a conception that is also at 
the heart of what is arguably the most important contribution of that paper, 
namely the two diagrams drawn by Hull. Let us now see what exactly is the 
conception of identity held by Hull and why it is important for our argument.
Hull’s starting point is that, at least since Aristotle, most philosophers have had 
a naïve view of biological individuality. Philosophers often use fictitious examples 
and, when they do actually speak of a living thing, they generally mean an 
animal, even a higher vertebrate in most cases (a horse, a cat, etc.). In contrast, 
Hull insists on the importance of using biological examples that are both more 
realistic and more diverse. According to him, such examples are more 
interesting, more complex, and in the end more challenging than the fictitious 
examples and thought experiments favoured by metaphysicians (the same idea is 
developed in Hull 2001). Taking into account the actual diversity of the living 
world implies, for Hull, a suspicion towards conceptions of biological 
individuality based on common sense and intuitive perception. Indeed, common- 
sense individuation is too strongly biased by our relative size and perception 
abilities (Hull 1978, 1992). For example, in dealing with many plants, colonial 
animals, fungi, microbes, and so on, common sense individuation is of no help 
whatsoever. Some cases have been much discussed in the biological and in the 
philosophical literature, such as dandelions, aspens, social insects, ascidians, 
siphonophores, and biofilms (for overviews on these cases, see Pradeu 2012; 
Bouchard and Huneman 2013; Guay and Pradeu 2016a).
In contrast to common sense and intuitive perception, Hull seeks to offer a 
biologically precise criterion for the diachronic identity of biological individuals; 
and he finds this criterion in the idea of continuity of change. According to Hull, 
organisms and species belong to the same ontological category, as both must be 
understood as spatio-temporally localized entities. More radically, Hull’s thesis is 
that any organism or any species is a portion of space and time. Every organism 
has a  (p.100) starting point and an end, and goes through different but 
continuous states between these two extremes. Exactly the same is true of every 
species. For Hull, because living things can undergo massive and unpredictable 
change, retention of substance (the idea that something of X remains through 
time) and resemblance (the idea that X looks sufficiently like itself) are useless 
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Figure 5.1  Ontogenetic change and 
splitting giving rise to the production of 
new organisms (in the case of organisms), 
or phylogenetic change and splitting 
leading to speciation (in the case of 
species). Based on Hull 1978
criteria for biological diachronic identity. The only satisfying criterion is 
continuity of change.
To describe and defend this continuity-based conception of identity, Hull 
explicitly endorses the notion of ‘genidentity’ in several texts and grounds it in 
the idea of a continuous internal organization:
Three traditional criteria for individuality in material bodies are retention 
of substance, retention of structure, and continuous existence through 
time (genidentity). If organisms are to count as individuals, then the first 
two criteria are much too restrictive. In point of fact, many organisms 
totally exchange their substance several times over while they retain their 
individuality. Others undergo massive metamorphosis as well, changing 
their structure markedly. If organisms are paradigm individuals, then 
retention of neither substance nor structure is either necessary or 
sufficient for continued identity in material bodies. The idea that comes 
closest to capturing individuality in organisms and possibly individuals as 
such is genidentity. As its name implies, this criterion allows for change 
just as long as it is sufficiently continuous. The overall organization of any 
entity can change but it cannot be disrupted too abruptly.
(Hull 1992: 182)
This is the very same conception of identity that underlies Hull’s (1978) 
fundamental diagrams; see Figures 5.1 and 5.2. These two figures offer a 
description of structural patterns of change in the living world that are equally 
applicable to organisms and species.
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Figure 5.2  Total or partial merging 
between organisms, or between species. 
Based on Hull 1978
 (p.101) Figure 5.1 illustrates 
structural changes associated 
either with change in a living 
entity or with its splitting into 
two living entities. For Hull, a 
new entity emerges from a 
given entity if and only if the 
internal organization of the 
original entity is strongly 
disrupted.3 This criterion—the 
disruption of internal 
organization—is not always easy 
to apply, and by definition the observer often faces a continuum of possible 
situations, but the examples given by Hull are very helpful. A living entity 
remains the same (case 1a) even if it undergoes a limited change, or even a 
radical change, provided that the continuity between these different states can 
be established (e.g. a caterpillar becoming a butterfly). In contrast, the 
phenomenon of splitting (case 1b) is characterized by a disruption of internal 
organization: one individual becomes two individuals and the initial individual 
disappears. Transverse fission in paramecia is an example. In other situations, 
an individual appears on another, preexisting individual, and this new individual 
becomes progressively autonomous (case 1c). An example is strobilization in 
certain forms of Scyphozoa (sometimes colloquially called “true jellyfish”). In yet 
other cases, a small part of an individual gains independence and becomes itself 
a new individual (case 1d; note that this is a part of an individual—not an 
individual growing on another, as in case 1c). An example is budding in 
Hydrozoa (Hydrozoa are Cnidaria that have both a polypoid and a medusoid 
stage in their life cycles—or at least most of them do). Though classifying all the 
diversity of real biological phenomena of change and splitting into these four 
cases would probably prove very difficult, what seems clear and useful is the 
criterion used by Hull, who asks systematically whether the overall organization 
of the entity under consideration is disrupted or not. (Importantly, there is 
transgenerational material continuity between a parent and its offspring, but 
they are characterized by two different internal organizations, and it is precisely 
this criterion that makes the difference between the continuity of one being and 
the continuity of several beings through reproduction; this issue is addressed in 
chapter 7.)
Figure 5.2 describes the merging of two living entities, or of their parts. To 
distinguish among the different possible situations, here again Hull uses the 
disruption of internal organization as a criterion. Two entities can fuse to 
become one single entity and remain one entity for a significant period of time, 
so the two initial individuals are lost (case 2a; fusion in amoebas does not 
constitute an adequate illustration of this case, while the fusion of two germ 
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cells does). In other situations (case 2b), a portion of a first individual becomes a 
portion of a second individual, the two individuals continue their existence, but 
both have changed (the first has lost a part, the second has gained a part). Blood 
transfusion or bacterial conjugation are good examples. In still other situations, 
a portion of a first individual and a portion of a second individual merge to form 
a third (new) individual, while the two initial individuals continue their existence 
(case 2c). Sexual reproduction is a good example. Applied to species rather than 
organisms, a good example of 2b is introgression and a good example of 2c is 
speciation by polyploidy (a rather common event in plants, for instance).
 (p.102) In conclusion, Hull endorsed the genidentity view. For him, what 
biologists can and must do to account for the continuously changing identity of 
any living thing is to follow its changes through time, keeping in mind that it 
remains the same only as long as its internal organization remains the same or 
changes progressively.
Naturally, one immediate difficulty faced by Hull’s account of biological identity 
is to offer a precise definition of what ‘internal organization’ (and its disruption) 
means. Suggestions to move in this direction will be made in section 5; for now, I 
would like to show why recent biological data about symbiosis strengthen Hull’s 
line of argument.
4. Why Cases of Symbiosis Strengthen the Genidentity View
As we have seen, Hull claims that, because living entities can change, merge, 
and split, it is crucial, in order to understand their diachronic individuality, to be 
able to actually follow them through time. But how frequent are events of 
merging and splitting in the living world? Though Hull mentions several 
important examples of fusion and splitting, symbiosis does not play an important 
role in his demonstration (apart from the rapid mention of the endosymbiotic 
event that is at the origin of some organelles). Now, research done on symbiosis 
in the twenty-first century shows that symbiotic events of fusion and splitting are 
much more frequent than had traditionally been assumed (McFall-Ngai 2002; 
McFall-Ngai et al. 2013; Gilbert and Epel 2015). In fact, we will see that the 
pervasiveness of symbiosis proves that Hull’s diagrams, which at first sight 
might seem to concern only a limited number of biological cases, describe 
situations that are in fact very frequent in nature. Indeed, by taking into account 
symbioses, one realizes that living things commonly undergo events like a 2a 
(fusion) or a 2b (integration with continuation)—or, even more frequently, like an 
‘inverted 1c’ (internalization; see Figure 5.3)—and that they can also split more 
often than is usually thought.
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Figure 5.3  Forms of integration of 
external biological material, at the 
organism level or the species level. The 
first case corresponds to Hull’s 2a 
(fusion), the second to Hull’s 2b 
(integration with continuation), while the 
third case is an inversion of Hull’s 1c. The 
third case (absent in Hull’s analysis) can 
be called ‘internalization’, and is 
described in this chapter as an extremely 
frequent (though long overlooked) 
phenomenon in nature
‘Symbiosis’ can be understood 
here in the very broad sense of 
any close and lasting 
interaction between two 
biological entities belonging to 
two different species. This is in 
accordance with the traditional 
definition of Anton de Bary, 
formulated in 1879 (see e.g. 
Sapp 1994). Adopting this broad 
definition is important here, as 
the  (p.103) definition can 
cover cases that range from 
mutualism (in which the fitness 
of the two partners is increased 
by the interaction) to 
commensalism (a neutral 
interaction) and to parasitism 
(in which the fitness of one 
partner increases while the 
fitness of the other decreases). 
Indeed, all these different cases exist among the recently documented examples 
of symbioses.4
Important events of symbiotic fusions occur both at the level of organisms and at 
the level of species. At the level of organisms, symbioses, long thought to be 
rather rare, are now considered almost ubiquitous (McFall-Ngai et al. 2013; 
Gilbert and Epel 2015). Indeed, probably all organisms are hosts of many 
microorganisms, very often in close and long-lasting associations. Very well 
documented cases include plants, hydra, cnidarians, sponges, fishes, the squid 
Euprymna scolopes, insects, mice, and humans (Bosch and McFall-Ngai 2011; 
Nyholm and McFall-Ngai 2014). There is often a co-construction of the host and 
the microbes, as illustrated by cases such as legume–rhizobia (Oldroyd 2013) or 
Euprymna scolopes–Vibrio fischeri (Nyholm and McFall-Ngai 2004) interactions. 
In many cases the association is beneficial to one of the partners or to both. In 
particular, and perhaps counterintuitively, it is frequently the case that 
interactions with some microbes shape and strengthen the host’s immune 
system (Pradeu and Carosella 2006b; Round and Mazmanian 2009). Very 
interesting cases are those where some microbes are indispensable for the 
development of the host (McFall-Ngai 2002; Pradeu 2011). The notion of a 
heterogeneous organism (Pradeu 2010, 2012) captures this very general idea, 
that all known organisms seem to harbour huge quantities of biological entities 
belonging to other species and that, in many of them, those biological entities 
become so integrated into the host’s that they can be considered part of it. 
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Which of these cases count as merging events, as described by Hull? The 
decision, for each, will depend, here again, on the degree of disruption of 
internal organization. For example, the legume–rhizobia symbiosis offers a clear 
case of merging, and, more precisely, of internalization (case 3c, which can also 
be called ‘inverted 1c’). The plant could live without the bacteria, but the 
recruitment of the bacteria at the root level helps the plant decisively (the 
rhizobia create ammonia from nitrogen in the air, which is used by the plant to 
create amino acids and nucleotides), and the bacteria are very significantly 
transformed during the process, differentiating into bacteroids. The association 
between the two partners eventually constitutes a unit that displays a high 
degree of internal organization. In contrast, the colonization of a host by a 
microbe (be it pathogenic, commensal, or mutualistic) that would not remain for 
long in the host, would not be transformed by this interaction, and would not, in 
turn, have a deep effect on the overall organization of the host. Consequently, it 
would not count as a case of merging.
Symbiotic events of merging also happen at the species level. A nice example is 
the obligate symbiotic association between aphids and Buchnera symbionts 
(more precisely, Acyrthosphion pisum and Buchnera aphidicola). Approximately 
160–280 million years ago (Shigenobu and Wilson 2011), an aphid ancestor was 
infected with a free-living eubacterium, and this eubacterium became 
established within aphid cells. The host and the Buchnera endosymbiont became 
interdependent and  (p.104) unable to survive without each other. The growth 
of Buchnera became integrated with that of the aphids, which acquired the 
endosymbionts from their mothers before birth. Speciation of host lineages was 
paralleled by divergence of associated endosymbiont lineages, resulting in 
parallel evolution of Buchnera and aphids (Baumann et al. 1995). Today the 
aphid–Buchnera association (almost all 4,000 extant species of aphid harbour an 
obligate Buchnera symbiont) constitutes one of the best-documented cases of 
obligate symbiosis, where neither of the partners can survive and reproduce 
without the other (Shigenobu and Wilson 2011). In such situations the 
physiological and reproductive integration between the host and the bacterium 
is so tight that it makes sense to talk about a single unit, constituted by this 
association.
Merging events can also happen between a virus and a host species (Pradeu 
2016). For example, many parasitoid wasps have integrated a polydnavirus into 
their genome several million years ago. Such polydnaviruses have a beneficial 
effect on the parasitoid wasps: they enable them to realize their life cycle by 
laying their eggs into their hosts, where then their offspring grow, often killing 
the host progressively in the process. In fact, the wasp eggs can survive and 
develop only because a virus integrated into the wasp’s genome actively 
counters the immune defense of the host larva (Edson et al. 1981; Espagne et al. 
2004; Bézier et al. 2009). Many specialists consider that the virus has been so 
tightly integrated into the host genome that it is no longer possible to regard the 
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virus and the wasp as separate entities (Roossinck 2015; on host–virus 
mutualisms, see also Virgin et al. 2009).
In many cases, therefore, symbiosis can give rise to new lineages, constituted by 
the merging of two individuals who belong to different species and subsequently 
reproduce as new reproductive units. The idea that symbiotic events are crucial 
in evolution and can even lead to the appearance of new species (i.e. 
symbiogenesis) is not new (Wallin 1927; Margulis and Fester 1991; Margulis and 
Sagan 2002), but this phenomenon has recently been illustrated by several 
examples, including some of those mentioned above. It seems legitimate, in 
these cases, to use the notions of heterogeneous species and heterogeneous 
lineages, on the model of the heterogeneous organism (mentioned above).5
What about cases of symbiotic splitting? Taking into account symbioses is likely 
to lead to a very dynamic view of biological individuality, because many 
symbiotic interactions change through time. For example, humans are hosts to 
billions of microbes from birth to old age, but the composition of their 
microbiome changes significantly through time. Immediately after birth, bacteria 
colonize the baby upon passage through the birth canal. The microbiota then has 
a complex history. There is a first period, until approximately the age of one, 
during which the microbiota has a rather simple composition (Bifidobacteria 
being usually highly abundant in human milk-fed infants); but this changes 
rapidly and a second period follows during which the microbiota becomes highly 
diverse (more than 1,000 species, with a clear domination of Firmicutes and 
Bacteroidetes), indeed unique to each individual,  (p.105) and stabilizes (see 
Candela et al. 2012). This is even clearer in the many cases of parasitic 
symbioses where the association is transient, for example because the parasite 
leaves the first host in order to colonize a second, or because the host eliminates 
the parasite via its immune system. Importantly, even a transient interaction 
between two living things can lead to very significant changes in their respective 
internal organizations; hence there is no direct link between the robustness and 
durability of a symbiotic interaction and the extent to which it impacts the 
internal organization of the partners.
In conclusion, the double phenomena of merging and splitting happen 
successively in many instances of symbiotic interactions, probably reflecting 
complex physiological, ecological, and evolutionary exchanges between the two 
partners. From all the examples examined here it can be concluded that 
symbiotic events of merging and splitting are extremely frequent in nature, 
which makes Hull’s analyses and diagrams even more useful than they might 
have seemed when the paper was published in 1978. The ubiquity of symbiosis 
decisively strengthens Hull’s point that genidentity offers the best way to 
capture the individuality of biological entities through time. Indeed, it seems 
clear that using an essentialist account based on genetic homogeneity or an 
account based on similarity would be entirely inadequate. Only the idea of a 
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continuous change enables us to follow in detail what contributes to the 
construction of a given living thing; and, here again, the criterion of the degree 
of disruption of internal organization seems a suitable guide for understanding 
biological diachronic individuality.
5. How Genidentity Helps Define What an Organism Is
The genidentity view seems very useful if you want to understand biological 
identity. Nevertheless, it faces a series of important challenges, and in fact it is 
likely that any process-based view of the living world will also have to meet 
those same challenges. The basic idea at the heart of the genidentity view is to 
follow a biological process through time. But how does one choose adequately 
which processes to follow? And how does one follow them in practice?
In my view, these questions are very important, and the answer to them will 
depend on who asks them and for what purpose. This is where it becomes clear 
that one of the main interests of the genidentity view is that it places the 
emphasis on an epistemological, rather than ontological, approach to processes. 
I do not think that it is possible to prove the ontological claim that the biological 
world is ‘really’ made of processes; and, if this is indeed the claim that process 
philosophers of biology want to make, then they must give an argument for it. 
However, it is possible to give good arguments in favour of the adoption of an 
epistemological process view and to show that, from this epistemological point of 
view, the decision to interpret the living world in terms of processes (rather than 
of already individualized things) makes an important difference to scientific 
work, because it leads to different perspectives and potentially to different 
experimental programs.
Biologists will decide which process or processes to follow according to their 
working questions. For example, one may ask how reproduction is achieved in a 
given species, or how metabolism is maintained in a cell, or how DNA 
transcription into RNA occurs. These different processes happen at different 
levels and involve  (p.106) many different entities. What is crucial is to decide 
which process will be followed and which criteria can help us consider that we 
are dealing with one continuous process. This is exactly the question raised by 
Hull. However, he only did so at a very general level, by talking about the 
maintenance or disruption of the ‘internal organization’ of an organism or a 
species. In my view, Hull was on the right track, but the notion of internal 
organization needs to be defined much more precisely in each specific biological 
context.
Here I propose to define in precise terms what internal organization is and what 
its maintenance or disruption entails at the level of an organism (a similar 
reflection can be produced, and indeed has been produced, at the species level; 
see e.g. Haber 2016). More specifically, I suggest that immunity helps to offer a 
more precise conception of genidentity applied to organisms (see also Pradeu 
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2012: 248–9). In all species (animals, plants, and also prokaryotes), the immune 
system plays a decisive role in the delineation of the boundaries of the organism 
because it constitutes a principle of inclusion–exclusion: the immune system is 
responsible for the rejection or tolerance of any given entity, which means that 
the immune system determines which entities will be part of the organism and 
which won’t. Importantly, this discrimination mechanism is not based on the 
traditional ‘self’ versus ‘nonself’ distinction, according to which an organism 
would immunologically reject all foreign entities and would immunologically 
accept only constituents originating from itself. Actually, every organism 
harbours huge quantities of genetically foreign entities and triggers, everyday, 
effector immune responses that target endogenous constituents.6
An immunological approach leads to a definition of the organism based on the 
distinction between two different levels: that of biochemical interactions and 
that of immune interactions, both necessary to delineate the organism. From 
that point of view, an organism can be defined as follows:
Definition: Organism = a functionally integrated whole, made up of 
heterogeneous constituents that are locally interconnected by strong 
biochemical interactions, and controlled by systemic immune interactions.
(Pradeu 2010: 258; see also Pradeu 2012: 243–6)
This definition means that, when entities interact through regular biochemical 
interactions and are actively tolerated by the continuous action of an immune 
system, they are part of a higher-level entity, which should be called an 
‘organism’. Of course, this definition places a strong emphasis on the role of the 
immune system in the definition of the organism, but it does so on the basis of 
the argument that the immune system plays a decisive role in delineating the 
boundaries of any organism.  (p.107) This definition rests on the recognition of 
two layers of interactions (biochemical interactions and immune interactions), 
which can be seen as a way to make more precise process approaches to the 
living world. What is suggested here is that there can exist some coalescences of 
interrelated processes, such as the organism itself, and that following such a 
coalescence of processes through time might rest on the identification of higher- 
level processes that control lower-level processes. Thus, an organism can be 
understood as a local concentration of intertwined biochemical processes under 
the control of higher-level immunological processes. More generally, it is crucial 
for a process philosophy to be able to identify not only processes in general, but 
also ‘bundles’ of processes (in this case, the organism), as well as to ask how the 
unity and cohesiveness of these bundles through time is achieved.
The crucial point is that, with the definition of the organism given above, we do 
not start with a preexisting delineation of the organism and subsequently say 
that the immune system controls this preexisting delineation. Qn the contrary, 
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Figure 5.4  Rejection between two 
colonies of Botryllus schlosseri. Panel A 
shows an example of rejection between 
two colonies of Botryllus schlosseri at the 
level of the colonies themselves; the 
brown zones at the point of contact 
between the ampullae (the finger-like 
structures at the center of the image) 
show the starting point of the reaction of 
rejection. Panel B shows an example of 
rejection between two colonies of 
Botryllus schlosseri at the much more 
precise level of the ampullae. 
Photographs courtesy of Tony De Tomaso, 
University of California, Santa Barbara
we start with biochemical and immunological interactions and, from the 
observation of how these interactions work, we deduce what the boundaries of 
the organism are. In this view, therefore, what comes first is interactions, and 
the organism ‘supervenes’ on those interactions. To understand this point fully, it 
is useful to move away from familiar mammalian examples and to examine more 
complex cases of biological individuality, in particular colonial organisms. A 
particularly illuminating case is that of Botryllus schlosseri (see Figure 5.4). 
Botryllus, born as a chordate tadpole larva, metamorphs into a sessile, 
invertebrate juvenile, after which it begins a lifelong, recurring budding process 
that results in a colony of expanding, asexually derived individuals. The colony is 
made of genetically identical individuals (zooids) united by a common 
extracorporeal vasculature. The zooids and the vasculature are embedded in a 
cellulose-based tunic, and the extracorporeal vasculature ramifies throughout 
this matrix and at the periphery terminates in finger-shaped projections  (p.108) 
called ‘ampullae’. When two colonies meet, an allorecognition reaction occurs, 
which leads either to vascular fusion or to rejection. Allorecognition is controlled 
by a single, highly polymorphic locus (the Fu/HC), and the rejection is realized 
through the triggering of an immune response (Scofield et al. 1982; Nyholm et 
al. 2006; McKitrick and De Tomaso 2010; McKitrick et al. 2011).
In the case of Botryllus 
schlosseri, as in many other 
cases of colonial organisms, it is 
very difficult to say whether 
what should count as an 
individual organism is each 
zooid or the colony as a whole— 
or perhaps both. In fact, 
common sense cannot decide 
between those options. 
According to the view I have 
presented, it is the observation 
of how immune responses occur 
that tells us what should count 
as an individual organism. As 
illustrated in Figure 5.4, 
immunologically controlled 
fusion or rejection in Botryllus 
schlosseri occurs at the level of 
the whole colony, so it is the 
colony that must count as an 
individual organism, in 
accordance with the definition 
presented above.
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The example of Botryllus illustrates one very important advantage of the 
approach presented here: we start with an indistinct, non-individualized reality, 
about which common sense and perception have little to say, and it is the 
decision to follow immunological processes that leads us to conclude, in a 
scientifically precise way, what counts as an individual entity and what its 
boundaries are.
6. Genidentity as a Way to Shed Light on the Notion of Biological Process: 
‘Priority’ as the Central Question
I believe that the multilayered genidentity approach developed here can be 
useful to the current trend towards a processual biology (Dupré 2012; Bapteste 
and Dupré 2013; Dupré 2014).
First, it emphasizes the importance of an epistemological approach to processes. 
Though process proponents often think in ontological terms (this is very explicit, 
e.g., in Bapteste and Dupré 2013), I do not think that they have hitherto offered 
compelling arguments for this view. With an epistemological approach, the aim 
is, more modestly, to show that a process view can make a difference to the 
actual work of biologists, as a question framed in terms of what processes 
biologists are interested in and how they should follow those processes through 
time. (A nice example is the argument offered in Dupré and Guttinger 2016.)
Second, this approach clarifies the idea, often expressed by process 
philosophers, that we live in a world of change. According to the genidentity 
view, what is interesting is to study how things change, at which pace, and when 
they start and cease to exist. Within such a perspective change is pervasive, and 
what is derivative is not change but the apparent absence of change, that is, 
regularities and sameness, and therefore even apparent stability must be 
explained in terms of constantly changing processes.
Third and perhaps most importantly, the genidentity view shows that the crucial 
claim of a process approach is in fact a claim about priority. Indeed, a process 
approach does not emphasize the importance of change itself (substantialist 
philosophers perfectly admit that every substance changes constantly) so much 
as it asks  (p.109) whether the ‘thing’ or the ‘process’ comes first; and it 
answers that things come second, after processes, or derive from them. In other 
words, the important move of a processual perspective is not, in my view, to go 
from individuals to processes (by saying, for instance, that individuals are in fact 
processes), but to go from processes to individuals (as scientists or philosophers, 
we decide to follow some scientifically meaningful processes, and individuals 
supervene on these processes). This is exactly what I have tried to illustrate in 
the case of immunology: in this case, it is scientifically identified processes that 
tell us where the individual lies and what its boundaries are, and not vice versa. 
We cannot start with the ‘thing’ Botryllus schlosseri, because we just don’t know 
where a Bottrylus schlosseri starts and ends; the only solution is to start with 
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processes—namely, as I suggested, biochemical and immune processes—and it is 
the realization of these processes that tells us where the individual is and what 
its boundaries are. The example of Botryllus schlosseri constitutes in fact a good 
model for thinking more generally about the individuation of living entities in 
other species: we cannot assume that we start by identifying an entity and then 
ask what processes occur in that entity, because we cannot trust our intuitions 
and perceptions with identifying living entities. So in each case—even in 
seemingly ‘intuitive’ cases, such as that of humans—it is necessary to start with 
scientifically well-defined processes—here, immunological processes; and it is 
those processes that tell us where the individual is and what its boundaries are.
7. Conclusions
The genidentity view seems particularly well suited if we wish to understand the 
diachronic identity of living things. Given the frequency of events such as 
extensive structural changes (e.g. through metamorphosis), splitting, and fusion, 
conceptions of biological identity based on similarity or substance are highly 
problematic. Hull (1978) perceived this point very well, but we have seen that 
recent work on symbiosis shows that his view is probably even more compelling 
today than it was in the 1970s. So the first lesson of the present chapter is that 
the genidentity view is a very satisfying way to conceive of biological identity.
The second lesson of this chapter is that the genidentity view sheds an important 
light on process views in biology and philosophy of biology (Dupré 2012; 
Bapteste and Dupré 2013; Dupré 2014). Indeed, it emphasizes the importance of 
an epistemological and multilayered approach to processes and suggests that 
the main claim of a process view is one of priority, namely that processes come 
first and make it possible to define things, and not the other way around.
Even though the notion of genidentity has not been very popular among 
philosophers of science, there is still perhaps much that we can learn from it.
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Notes:
(1) On processes in general, and on the opposition between processes and 
substances, see Seibt 2013.
(2) On the different versions of the genidentity concept for Reichenbach, see 
Padovani (2013) and Guay and Pradeu (2016b).
(3) ‘The relevant consideration is how much of the parent organism is lost and its 
internal organization disrupted’ (Hull 1978: 345).
(4) For complementary discussions of symbiosis, see chapters 1, 9, 10, and 15.
(5) On this issue, see also Dupré and O’Malley 2009 and Bouchard 2010. More 
generally, on the integration of ‘foreign’ genetic material, in particular through 
horizontal gene transfer, see Doolittle and Bapteste 2007 and Bapteste et al. 
2012.
(6) Much more specifically, the discontinuity theory of immunity that I have 
constructed with immunologists (Pradeu and Carosella 2006a; Pradeu et al. 
2013) reflects directly a genidentity perspective. Indeed, a crucial claim of the 
most elaborate versions of the genidentity view, including Reichenbach’s (see 
Guay and Pradeu 2016b), is that what matters to understanding diachronic 
identity is not the degree of change (i.e. how much it changes) but the rate of 
change (i.e. how fast it changes). The discontinuity theory of immunity is based 
on the principle that the immune system responds to sudden modifications of the 
antigenic motifs with which it interacts (for further details, see Pradeu 2012).
